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Abstract 
In the Sandbox Task (e.g. Sommerville, Bernstein & Meltzoff, 2013), participants indicate where a 
protagonist who has a false belief about the location of an object will look for that object in a trough 
filled with a substrate that conceals the hidden object’s location. Previous findings that participants 
tend to indicate a location closer to where they themselves know the object to be located have been 
interpreted as evidence of egocentric bias when attributing mental states to others. We tested the 
assumption that such biases occur as a result of reasoning about mental states specifically. We found 
that participants showed more egocentric bias when reasoning from a protagonist’s false belief than 
from their own memory, but found equivalent levels of bias when they were asked to indicate where a 
false film would depict the object as when they were asked about a protagonist’s false belief. Our 
findings suggest that that egocentric biases found in adult false belief tasks are more likely due to a 
general difficulty with reasoning about false representations than a specialised difficulty with 













Successfully comprehending what someone else thinks, knows, sees or believes, known as Theory of 
Mind (ToM) or ‘mentalizing’, is a critical ability in our day-to-day interactions with other people (e.g. 
Clark & Brennan, 1991; Grice, 1975; Sperber & Wilson, 2002), and has attracted a vast amount of 
research as a result (for reviews see Apperly, 2010; Apperly & Butterfill, 2009; Carruthers, 2015; 
Heyes, 2014a; 2014b). Historically, ToM was thought to develop at around four years of age because 
this is when typically developing children are capable of attributing false beliefs to others, showing 
that they are aware that what they believe and what another person believes can differ (Wellman, 
Cross, & Watson, 2001). However, even adults, who clearly understand that states of mind can vary 
from person to person, are susceptible to egocentric bias; that is, they struggle to disengage from their 
own current mental states when reasoning about the mental states of others. For instance, it has been 
shown that adults over-ascribe their own thoughts and feelings to others (e.g. Ross, Greene, & House, 
1977; Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003), that they fail to fully take into account that what others see 
may differ from what they see (e.g. Apperly, Carroll, Samson, Humphreys, Qureshi, & Moffitt, 2010; 
Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003), that what they believe may not be what others believe (e.g. Coburn, 
Bernstein, & Begeer, 2015), and that others may be less knowledgeable than they are (e.g. Bernstein, 
Atance, Loftus, & Meltzoff, 2004).  
Crucially, the intrusion of our own knowledge, or an important proportion of such intrusions, 
is often argued to be specific to cases where we reason about others’ mental states, and not when 
thinking about functionally equivalent information held in other formats, such as memories, rules, or 
non-mental representations such as photographs. A number of researchers have argued for a degree of 
domain-specificity for ToM processes (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; Cohen, Sasaki & German, 2015; 
Leslie, 1987; Leslie, Friedman & German, 2004; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), and such accounts would 
seem to support the possibility—at least indirectly—that levels of egocentric bias may vary depending 
on whether a mental representation is processed by a specialised cognitive mechanism.  
Evidence for an important role for reasoning about mental states in the generation of 
egocentric biases comes from a number of studies where a naïve protagonist’s mental state or visual 
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perspective is required to be ‘read’, such as in false belief tasks and perspective taking tasks (e.g. 
Apperly et al., 2010; Bernstein, Thornton, & Sommerville, 2011; Coburn et al., 2015; Dumontheil, 
Apperly & Blakemore, 2010).  For example, in the Director’s Task (e.g. Keysar, Barr, & Horton, 
1998; Keysar et al., 2003; Apperly et al., 2010), participants are instructed to move objects within a 
4x4 grid by a director. In doing this they need to take into account the director’s perspective when 
interpreting their instructions because some slots of the grid are occluded by opaque inserts that 
prevent the director seeing into them. For instance, if asked by the director on the other side of the 
grid to ‘move the small ball’ when the participant sees three balls of differing size, the smallest of 
which is not in the director’s view, the correct response is to move the medium-sized ball. Despite 
being made explicitly aware that the director’s view is partial, even healthy adult participants make 
errors—that is, they sometimes select objects that only they can see. Crucially, when participants are 
asked to follow an abstract rule, according to which they should ignore all objects in occluded slots, 
they must ignore the same objects as when they have to take into account the director’s perspective—
that is, the information is functionally identical to the director-present condition. Yet in this abstract 
rule version of the task, participants make fewer egocentric errors than in the director-present version 
(Apperly et al., 2010; Dumontheil, Apperly & Blakemore, 2010; though see Dumontheil, Hildebrandt, 
Apperly, & Blakemore, 2012; Dumontheil, Küster, Apperly, & Blakemore, 2010). It is argued that 
this shows that egocentric bias is greater when reasoning about mental states specifically, since in the 
rule version the task requirement was functionally identical.   
However, previous concerns within the developmental literature that such biases may 
generalise to all representations have led researchers to compare children’s performance on false 
belief tasks with tasks requiring children to reason about other forms of false representations, such as 
false photographs (e.g. Leekam & Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Slaughter, 1998; Zaitchik, 
1990). Recently, the photograph control has also been used to investigate adults’ biases in ToM tasks. 
When applied to the Director’s Task, with participants required to follow instructions based on what 
appeared in a photograph rather than according to a director’s instructions, similar error rates were 
found in the photograph and the ‘ToM’ version of the experiment (Santiesteban, Shah, White, Bird, 
 5 
and Heyes, 2015). These results suggest that egocentric bias may be linked to the reasoning about 
representations per se, be they mental or non-mental, a view that is supported by a number of 
developmental studies (e.g. Iao & Leekam, 2014; Iao, Leekam, Perner, & McConachie, 2011; 
Leekam, Perner, Healey, & Sewell, 2008; Zaitchik, 1990).  
The results of these studies suggest that a mental-state specific account of egocentric bias 
needs to simultaneously satisfy not one but two independent requirements in order to hold. We term 
these requirements the Representation Contrast and the Mentalizing Contrast (see Figure 1). The most 
basic requirement is the Representation Contrast, which contends that there is something unique to the 
processing of representations—be they mental or non-mental—that leads to one’s own knowledge 
intruding more compared to when processing functionally identical but semantic content, such as 
memories or rules. For example, greater egocentric bias should be found when reasoning about 
another’s belief (e.g. ‘Where does she think the item is?’) compared to reasoning from one’s own 
memory (e.g. ‘Where was the item originally hidden?’) or a rule (e.g. ‘Ignore objects in front of 
occluders’). The Mentalizing Contrast, on the other hand, states that there is something special about 
the processing of mental representations that is not captured when processing functionally identical 
information carried instead by non-mental representations, such as photos (e.g. ‘Where will the photo 
show the object was hidden?’). Therefore, the Mentalizing Contrast predicts the presence of additional 
bias related to thinking about beliefs over and above any bias related to thinking about photos or 
similar non-mental representations. Evidence of a unique proportion of egocentric bias attributable to 
the mental representation tasks tested against both the Representation Contrast and the Mentalizing 
Contrasts would suggest particularly strong support for a mental-state specific account of egocentric 
bias, as it would be shown to differ from both semantic knowledge and other forms of representation. 
On the other hand, support for the Representation Contrast alone would instead support the view that 
egocentric bias is the result of processing representations per se. Since there is presently no theory in 
the literature which predicts greater bias for non-mental representations than both mental 
representations and semantic content in the simultaneous absence of a difference between the latter 
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formats, we take these two hypotheses to be hierarchical, such that we may find support for the 
Representation Contrast in the absence of support for the Mentalizing Contrast, but not vice versa. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
In the present study, we aimed to investigate the ToM Account by testing both the 
Representation Contrast and Mentalizing Contrast in healthy adult participants. One potential 
criticism of tasks used to test ToM accounts, such as the Director Task and the classic change-of-
location false belief task, is that they may lack sensitivity to egocentric biases in adults because they 
rely largely on an analysis of dichotomous correct/incorrect data, which are not sensitive to the degree 
of bias that may be present in adults but that is not produced in cases where only one of two responses 
is permitted. A recent candidate for a task that avoids such issues is the ‘Sandbox Task’, adapted by 
Bernstein, Sommerville and colleagues (Bernstein et al., 2011; Sommerville, Bernstein, and Meltzoff, 
2013) from a paradigm originally developed by Huttenlocher, Newcombe, and Sandberg (1994). In 
this task, the participant is told about a scenario in which a protagonist hides an object in a trough 
(‘sandbox’) while being watched by a second person. The protagonist then moves the object to 
another location within the same trough while the second person is absent. The trough has no 
distinctive features, and as such, participants’ responses are not confined to two discrete locations, as 
is the case in more typical false belief tasks. Thus, the Sandbox Task provides a scalar metric (i.e. 
measured in centimetres) rather than a binary one and as such is more sensitive to subtle response 
biases. Typically, when participants are asked to indicate where the person with a false belief would 
search for the object, they tend to indicate locations closer to the object’s actual location (where 
participants know the object to be) than would be expected by chance. Moreover, this egocentric bias 
is greater than when participants are asked to locate, based on their own memory, where the object 
was first hidden (Sommerville et al., 2013; Coburn et al., 2015). As with the results of the Director 
Tasks, these findings from the Sandbox Task have been seen as evidence of an increased tendency to 
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be biased when reconstructing information from another person’s perspective or belief compared to 
when simply recalling the first location from personal memory. 
That the results from the Director’s Task may be explained by a bias when reasoning about 
any form of representation (not just beliefs and mental states) highlights the need to compare 
participants’ performance when reasoning about false mental representations with their performance 
when reasoning about false non-mental representations. To date, performance on the Sandbox Task 
has indicated that adults (and children) show greater bias on trials in which they have to indicate 
where another person mistakenly believes the hidden object to be compared to trials in which they 
have to indicate where they themselves remember the hidden object to be. This result would appear to 
satisfy the Representation Contrast. However, performance on these trials has not yet been compared 
to performance on matched non-mental representation trials. That is, there is evidence for the 
Representation Contrast, but not yet evidence for the Mentalizing Contrast. Consequently, we sought 
to test whether or not bias would be specific to mental state reasoning alone. Initially, we aimed to 
replicate the effect of bias on mental state trials versus memory trials. To do so, we presented 
participants with a Sandbox Task similar to those used in previous studies (Sommerville et al., 2013; 
Coburn et al., 2015). We compared the levels of bias on false belief trials, in which participants were 
asked to indicate where a protagonist with a false belief about the object’s location would search for 
the object, to memory trials, in which participants were asked to indicate from their own memory 
where the object was originally hidden. In both cases, the correct response would be the object’s 
original location).  Since we were also validating a version of the task for participants to perform 
online, it was also important to replicate this effect first. In Experiment 2 we tested whether 
equivalent bias occurs whenever participants have to reason about false representations. If bias is 
mental-state specific, as the Mentalizing Contrast holds, then bias should differ when participants are 
reasoning about another’s belief compared to when they are reasoning about the content of a non-







Participants were recruited using Prolific Academic (www.prolific.ac) and were required to be 
between 18–40 years of age, English native-speakers and residents of the UK. All provided informed 
consent and were compensated for their time. We recruited a total of 81 participants but excluded a 
large number who did not meet a series of attention and motivation checks (see Analysis section) such 
that the final sample size was 40. 
Materials 
The images presented to participants were modelled on the pen and paper version of the Sandbox 
Task developed by Coburn et al. (2015). All images1 were created in Powerpoint and converted into 
PNG files for presentation on Qualtrics (Qualtrics, Provo, UT, 2015). Participants saw the images in 
landscape (756 x 567 pixels) format, with a container (‘trough’) 584 pixels in width and 36 pixels in 
depth, centrally positioned on the horizontal axis, with text (red, bold font) above. Crosses (‘x’, 15 x 
15 pixels) on the troughs marked the locations where the object was hidden first (Location A) and 
hidden the second time (Location B). The distance the object moved from Location A to Location B 
were derived from Coburn et al. (2015) by converting the absolute distances reported into proportions 
of the length of the trough. Thus the object was moved either 22.65% (‘Short Move’ trials) or 45.3% 
(‘Long Move’ trials) of the trough to either the left or right of Location A, counterbalanced for both 
distance and direction (see Table 1). Given that the actual locations within the trough were not 
reported in Coburn et al., the co-ordinates of Location A were derived from Sommerville et al.’s 
(2013) Experiment 2 by converting them into proportions for use with our stimuli. The texts used in 
our study were based on those used in Sommerville et al.’s study (see supplementary information for 
texts). After participants had finished reading the test scenarios, they were given a word search puzzle 
to complete before being asked the test question. The word search task was used, as in Coburn et al. 
                                                           
1 Available from the author. 
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(2015) and Sommerville et al. (2013), to prevent participants from using a perceptual strategy to 
answer the test questions regarding the location of the hidden object. The word searches were created 
by inserting seven randomly-generated words into a word search puzzle using 
www.puzzlemaker.com.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Procedure 
The procedure for both experiments closely followed that used by Coburn et al. (2015). The test 
consisted of nine trials, eight experimental trials (four false belief trials and four memory trials) and 
one trial (true belief trial) designed to check participants’ attention. Each trial was formed of four 
slides (see Figure 2). In the eight experimental trials a vignette described how one protagonist saw an 
object hidden in the location A (slide 1) but did not see it being moved and hidden at location B (slide 
2). In the true belief trial the vignette described a protagonist who saw an object being hidden in both 
the first and the second location. All true belief trials were long distance trials. On the third slide, 
participants were presented with the word search, which remained on screen for 20 seconds. Finally, 
on the fourth slide participants were asked to indicate by clicking on a location with their mouse either 
where the object was first hidden (memory questions) or where the protagonist would search for the 
object (belief questions). We recorded where on the screen (in pixels) the participant clicked.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Following Coburn et al. (2015) the experimental trials and questions were presented in a fixed 
order with memory questions in trials 1, 2, 8 and 9 and false belief questions in trials 3, 4, 6 and 7. In 
all eight experimental trials the correct response was to indicate the first location in which the object 
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had been hidden. The true belief trial was always presented as the middle trial (trial 5) and 
participants were asked a belief question; unlike the 8 experimental trials the correct response was to 
indicate the second location in which the object had been hidden. 
Analysis 
For each trial, we converted the pixel on which the participant clicked into a measure of the 
participant’s relative bias. This was calculated by taking the difference in pixels between the correct 
location (in experimental trials this was the first location in which the object was hidden) and the 
location the participants clicked on and then dividing this difference by the length of the trough in 
pixels. The bias was assigned a negative value if the clicked-on location was further from the first 
location the object was hidden in relative to the second location the object was hidden in and a 
positive value if the clicked-on location was closer to the second location the object was hidden in.  
To allow for comparisons between studies we aimed to use some of the same statistical tests 
run by Coburn et al. (2015) and Sommerville et al. (2013), namely paired comparisons of the average 
bias between memory and false belief trials where the object was moved a ‘long’ distance and the 
average bias between memory and false belief trials where the object was moved a ‘short’ distance. 
As our data were not normally distributed, we report Wilcoxon signed-rank tests rather than the 
original t-tests. Following Coburn et al., we also compared the number of participants who showed 
greater bias on false belief trials than memory trials to the number of participants who did not. 
To ensure that participants were paying attention to the task we excluded from the analyses all 
participants who failed to indicate a location closer to the second point than the first on the attention-
check trial. Since this was the only trial type in which the second location was the correct response, 
any strategy that involved the consistent selection of the first location would lead to failure on this 
trial and exclusion from the results. Details of exclusions owing to attention checks are available in 





Figure 3 displays the results for each trial type, and Figure 4 displays the distribution of responses for 
each trial type. 
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
Overall, and consistent with previous research, bias was significantly larger when participants 
used the protagonist’s false belief to indicate the first location in which the object was hidden (Mdnbias 
= 3.7%) than when they used their own memory to indicate this location (Mdnbias = 0.6%), Z = 2.137, 
p = .033, r = .17). Of the 40 participants, 25 (63%) showed a positive bias score (greater bias on false 
belief than memory trials), though this proportion was not significant, 2(1, N = 40) = 2.5, p = .114. 
However, overall bias was significantly different from zero on false belief trials, Z = 4.274, p < .001, r 
= .48, but not on memory trials, Z = 1.465, p = .143, r = .16. 
We next analysed the data split by length of move (short vs. long). In long trials, participants 
were significantly biased towards the object’s second location when asked where the protagonist 
would search (Mdnbias = 2.0%, Z = 2.272, p = .023, r = .25) but not biased when asked to remember 
the object’s first location (Mdnbias = 0.3%, Z = 0.941, p = .347, r = .11). Bias was marginally larger in 
the false belief trials (Z = 1.707, p = .088, r = .19). Of the 40 participants, 24 (60%) showed a positive 
bias score (greater bias on false belief than memory trials), though this proportion was not significant, 
2(1, N = 40) = 1.6, p = .206. 
In short distance trials, participants were biased towards the second location that the object 
was hidden in when asked where the protagonist would search (Mdnbias = 3.3%, Z = 2.782, p = .005, r 
= .31) but not when asked to remember the first location in which the object was hidden (Mdnbias = -
1.6%, Z = 0.349, p = .727, r = .04). The bias shown in the false belief trials was not significantly 
larger than the bias found in the memory trials (Z = 1.546, p = .122, r = .17). Of the 40 participants, 
 12 
26 (66%) showed a positive bias score (greater bias on false belief than memory trials), a proportion 
of the total N that differed marginally from chance, 2(1, N = 40) = 3.6, p = .058. 
 
[Insert Figure 4 about here] 
 
Discussion 
Consistent with the results of previous research with young adults using the Sandbox Task (e.g. 
Coburn et al., 2015; Sommerville et al., 2013), we found evidence that participants tended to be more 
biased by their own current knowledge when making judgements about where a protagonist with a 
false belief would search for an object than when asked to remember where an object was hidden. A 
separate analysis that compared the number of participants who showed more bias on false belief 
trials to those participants who displayed more bias on memory trials, while not reaching statistical 
significance, confirmed that this pattern of results was not the result of extreme biases in a minority of 
individuals. As in some previous studies (e.g. Sommerville et al., 2013), we found some evidence that 
bias was more reliably present for one distance than another—in this case long distance trials. This 
may be due to the loss of statistical power when splitting the trials by distance (creating only two per 
condition), since when both short and long trials were analysed together the effect of bias was 
significantly greater on false belief than memory trials. In a different analysis, we found that bias only 
reached statistically significant levels when tested against zero on false belief trials, but not on 
memory trials. This effect was true regardless of distance, and this kind of analysis has not always 
been reported in previous research. In sum, we replicated the finding that participants are biased by 
their own knowledge of the location of an object when asked to reason about another’s false belief but 
not when merely asked to recall the location from memory. These results support the Representation 
Contrast, according to which bias towards one’s own knowledge is stronger when this knowledge is 
contrasted with another’s false belief than when it is contrasted with functionally identical but 
semantic content, such as in memory. 
 13 
In Experiment 2 we sought to test whether such bias is specific to mental states or extends to 
other forms of representation (the Mentalizing Contrast). We chose to employ a ‘false film’ condition 
to test this hypothesis. Although photographs have been used as controls in previous studies (Leekam 
& Perner, 1991; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Slaughter, 1998; Zaitchik, 1990), we here use a film 
sequence. Unlike photographs, film is not restricted to capturing a single moment, and is thus more 
closely matched to the belief condition in which the protagonist witnesses a scenario unfold over a 
period of time. Film is also able to represent the location of an object that is eventually unseen, as it 
captures the action of hiding it at the location, whereas a photo would be required to represent the 
brief moment in which the object is half-buried and still in the process of being hidden in order for the 
relevant location to be rendered visually. Finally, alternative formats such as false notes, maps or 
signs are less suitable for scenarios in which responses are indicated along a continuum rather than in 
discrete locations. 
Since the stories accompanying the slides in Experiment 1 were not created with the potential 
inclusion of non-mental representations in mind, we created new vignettes which were designed to 
make the scenarios more ecologically valid in the context of hiding objects, and more suitable for the 
inclusion of a condition in which the scene was filmed. Critically, the only difference between the 
false belief and false film trials was whether the question at the end of the trial asked about the content 
of a protagonist’s belief or the content of a film (see Figure 5). Otherwise the text was identical across 
condition. In order to avoid increasing the length of the task, all trials in Experiment 2 were belief or 





Eighty-nine participants were recruited and were pseudo-randomly assigned to start with belief trials 
(N = 46) or film trials (N = 43). Thirty-four participants did not meet our series of attention and 
 14 
motivation checks (see supplemental information for details) such that the final sample size was 55 
including 26 participants assigned to the Belief-Film order and 29 participants in the Film-Belief 
order.  
Procedure 
In this experiment, participants were given a scenario and were instructed at the very end to indicate 
wither where a protagonist believed an item to be, or where a camera than had been used to film the 
scene would depict the item. In this way, we sought to contrast the degree of bias that would be 
elicited from mental (belief) and non-mental (film) representations, and hence test the Mentalizing 
Contrast. An example scenario (scenario 3, in this experiment) began as follows: “Rebecca and Steve 
are in the restaurant kitchen. Rebecca has the tips jar, and Steve is filming her with a camera. While 
Steve is watching and filming her, Rebecca buries the tips jar in the freezer here. Steve then goes 
outside with the camera to smoke a cigarette.” On the second slide, the scenario continues: “While 
Steve is outside, Rebecca digs the tips jar out and hides it here. She puts everything else in the freezer 
back where it was so it looks undisturbed.” Finally, after the intervening word search, the test screen 
appeared with the following introductory text over the empty trough: “After a while, Steve comes 
back, still holding the camera.” This line was included regardless of condition to ensure that the 
context in which the test question was embedded was equivalent across both belief and film trials. 
Depending on the condition, the test question was either “Where does he think the tips jar is?” (belief 
trial) or “Where will the camera show the tips jar is?” (film trial). Each participant either received four 
false belief trials followed by a true belief trial or four film trials followed by a true belief trial, before 
completing four trials of the other condition. The order of the scenarios was always constant such that 
all scenarios that were followed by false belief questions for participants in one trial type order (e.g. 
Belief-Film) would be followed by film questions for participants assigned to the other trial type order 
(e.g. Film-Belief) (see Table 1). In all other respects, the experiment followed precisely the same 
procedure as that in experiment 1. 
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[Insert Figure 5 about here] 
 
Results 
Figure 6 displays the results for each trial type2, and Figure 7 the distribution of mean responses for 
each trial type. One scenario (trial 3, short distance) was removed from both the belief and film 
analyses owing to an error in the wording that rendered this item confusing. Retaining this item would 
not have altered the balance of bias between film and belief trials. 
 
[Insert Figure 6 about here] 
 
The order in which participants completed the task (false belief trials first vs. false film trials 
first) did not cause aggregate bias scores on either the false belief (U(55) = 277, p = .0923) or false 
film (U(55) = 281, p = .106) trials to differ; so we analysed the data collapsed over this factor. 
Overall, bias on false belief trials (Mdnbias = 1.3%) did not differ significantly from bias on false film 
trials (Mdnbias = 6.1%), Z = 1.341, p = .180, r = .13). Of the 55 participants, 29 (53%) showed greater 
bias on false belief than false film trials, and 26 (47%) the inverse, meaning that the numbers of 
participants who showed more bias on false belief trials did not differ from the number of participants 
who showed more bias on false film trials, 2(1, N = 55) = .164, p = .686. Additionally, bias was 
significantly different from zero on both false belief trials, Z = 2.354, p = .019, r = .22, and false film 
trials, Z = 4.064, p < .001, r = .39).  
                                                           
2 The data were again not normally distributed, and we report the results of Wilcoxon Signed-Rank 
tests as a result. 
3 Bias was marginally larger on belief trials if they came before film trials, but since this was non-
significant and crucially did not suggest the ‘anthropomorphising’ of the camera on film trials (since 
order only showed any effect on belief), we collapsed over order. 
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In long distance trials, participants were marginally biased towards the object’s second 
location when asked about the protagonist’s belief (Mdnbias = 0.1%, Z = 1.944, p = .052, r = .19) and 
significantly biased when asked to indicate where the film would depict the object’s first location 
(Mdnbias = 1.2%, Z = 2.991, p = .003, r = .29). Bias in the false film condition was marginally larger 
than bias in the false belief condition (Z = 1.684, p = .092, r = .16). Of the 55 participants, 30 (55%) 
showed greater bias in the false film condition than false belief condition. The numbers of participants 
who showed more bias on false belief trials did not differ from the number of participants who 
showed more bias on false film trials, 2(1, N = 55) = .455, p = .5. 
In short distance trials, participants were not significantly biased towards the second location 
where the object was hidden when asked about the protagonist’s belief (Mdnbias = 0.4%, Z = 1.408, p 
= .159, r = .13), but were marginally biased when asked to indicate where the film would depict the 
object’s first location (Mdnbias = 0.8%, Z = 1.835, p = .067, r = .17). There was no significant 
difference in bias between these two conditions (Z = 0.670, p = .503, r = .06). Of the 55 participants, 
31 (56%) showed greater bias on false film trials than false belief trials. Again, the numbers of 
participants who showed more bias on false belief trials did not differ from the number of participants 
who showed more bias on false film trials, 2(1, N = 55) = .891, p = .345. 
 
[Insert Figure 7 about here] 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 support the main finding of Experiment 1, namely that participants’ 
judgement about where the hidden object is represented in a belief is biased by participants’ 
knowledge of the true location of the object. However, this bias extended to a condition in which 
participants were asked to judge where a film would show the object hidden, such that bias was 
significant in both conditions and did not differ between conditions. This suggests that this bias is not 
exclusive to reasoning about other people’s mental states but is also evident when reconstructing a 
 17 
location based on a non-mental representation. Since each text in Experiment 2 was matched until the 
critical question on the final slide, and since the same participants responded to trials of both mental 
and non-mental representations, we controlled for the possibility that artefacts related to a between-
subjects design or differences in the wordings of the stories could account for the this finding. 
Overall, the results of Experiment 2 fail to support the Mentalizing Contrast; participants were as 




The use of non-mental representations as controls has previously revealed evidence that the role of 
specific ToM processes in eliciting egocentric biases may have been overestimated (e.g. Santiesteban 
et al., 2015; Zaitchik, 1990). In the present study, we argued that for a mental-state specific account of 
egocentric bias to hold, the bias must be manifested not only when contrasted against reasoning from 
semantic content (the Representation Contrast) but also when reasoning about non-mental 
representations (the Mentalizing Contrast). The results from the two experiments presented here show 
that, in the Sandbox Task, participants are biased towards where they know an object to be regardless 
of whether they are attempting to indicate the object’s location as represented by a mental or a non-
mental representation but are not biased when using their own memory to indicate the object’s 
location. In other words, we found evidence for the Representation Contrast, but not for the 
Mentalizing Contrast. Thus, the levels of bias found in the original Sandbox Task and the present 
study would appear not to be linked to a domain-specific process, such as reasoning about other 
people’s belief states, but to constraints on representations in general (e.g. Iao et al., 2011; Zaitchik, 
1990).  
The suggestion that the bias in the Sandbox Task is not specific to the attribution of beliefs 
also receives support from recent evidence that children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) show 
a similar degree of bias in the Sandbox Task to typically developing children (Begeer et al., 2016). 
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According to ToM-based accounts, children with impaired mentalizing abilities (such as those with 
ASD) should exhibit a greater bias than typically developing controls. Thus, together with the current 
experiment it would appear that the source of bias in the Sandbox Task is unlikely to be the result of 
mentalizing processes.  
Importantly, this account of participants’ bias in the Sandbox Task holds up to a number of 
counter-arguments that have been applied to similar claims. For instance, it has been argued that in 
certain cases stimuli used as non-social controls may be treated as agents (‘anthropomorphised’) and 
end up being processed by the Theory of Mind system (e.g. Furlanetto, Becchio, Samson, & Apperly, 
2016). Should this be the case, this process is most likely to have influenced the results of Experiment 
2, where half the participants first received trials where they had to reason about a protagonist’s belief 
and then received trials where they had to reason about a film’s representation of a hidden object’s 
location. This could have induced a carry-over effect whereby participants continued to treat the film 
trials as if they were belief trials. However, the order of presentation (belief followed by film or film 
followed by belief) showed no influence on levels of bias on film trials.  
A different, though related, argument might suggest that the film condition did not consist of 
a truly non-mental state, since the camera was operated by the protagonist, and the film might be 
thought of as ‘watched’ by the protagonist in order to answer the question “Where will the camera 
show…”. This is a common issue in non-mental control conditions in ToM tasks, as whatever the 
format (whether false film, false photo or false belief) it is not possible to conceive of a photo, note or 
film without imagining that a human, whether the protagonist or the participant, is ‘seeing’ the item in 
question, and hence non-mental formats can be seen in some sense as being ‘filtered’ through human 
perception. A corollary to this potential criticism is that having the protagonist operate the camera 
introduces an extra degree of such ‘filtering’. While we would very much take on board these 
objections at a theoretical level, seeing them as an inevitable consequence of having non-mental 
controls, there are a number of empirical reasons to believe that this is not how participants treated 
this condition. Firstly, it is a common finding in the theory of mind literature that participants follow 
instructions to reason from a specific representation, even when following this processing route is not 
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the most efficient strategy. For example, Cohen et al. (2015) found that participants were slower when 
instructed to reason from false notes than false beliefs, and Cohen and German (2010) found that 
participants were slower when instructed to reason from false maps and ‘false’ arrows, than false 
beliefs. Crucially, the outcome of the participants’ reasoning was identical regardless of whether they 
were asked to reason from a mental or non-mental state, yet a behavioural dissociation was clear. 
Evidence from neuroimaging experiments also supports differential processing of mental states and 
non-mental states as conveyed through purely textual instructions (such as ours), such as when 
contrasting “On Peter’s holiday photo…?” (false photo trials) with “The tourists now think…?” (false 
belief trials) (Perner, Aichhorn, Kronbichler, Staffen, & Ladurner, 2006). In the case of the holiday 
photo, ‘Peter’ was clearly identified as the one who took the photo, yet participants showed both a 
behavioural and neurological dissociation between false photo trials and false belief trials, suggesting 
participants did not apply mental state reasoning to false photos, but rather made their responses 
according to the specific wording of the instructions (see Schurz, Radua, Aichhorn, Richlan, & 
Perner, 2014, for a recent meta-analysis showing clear differences between the way participants 
respond to mental and non-mental states in tasks employing text-based vignettes such as ours). Most 
importantly, there is direct evidence for precisely such a behavioural dissociation from the difference 
in bias we found between memory trials and belief trials in experiment 1. The only reason for this 
must be that participants were working according to the wording of the critical question to either 
reason from a memory or the protagonist’s belief. Our decision to exclude from the analyses data 
from participants who did not show the requisite attention to the wording of the true belief trial was 
motivated precisely by the desire to ensure that participants were indeed following instructions on a 
trial-by-trial basis rather than adopting a strategy of ‘skipping’ the text and continually indicating the 
first location in which the objects was hidden. It is particularly convincing, in our view, that 
participants across all these studies did not appear to take the opportunity to ignore the belief element 
of the belief trials and instead follow a strategy of basing their decisions on their memory alone (in the 
case of our experiment) or beliefs alone (in the case of Cohen and colleagues’ and Perner and 
colleagues’ work), because doing so would actually have led to more accurate/faster responses. Our 
results, together with findings of other research in the literature, strongly suggest that when 
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participants were instructed to indicate where the camera will show the item, this is very likely how 
they arrived at their response.” 
An alternative account for the apparent difficulty of reasoning from others’ beliefs as opposed 
to one’s own memories (our experiment 1) comes from the literature on the role of self-other 
differentiation on perspective taking4. For example, it has been shown that participants are less likely 
to be biased by their own knowledge when judging an out-group member’s belief than an in-group 
member’s belief, or when they have been primed to a distinction between themselves and other people 
(Santiesteban, White, Cook, Gilbert, & Heyes, 2012; Todd, Hanko, Galinsky, & Mussweiler, 2011). 
Although we did not manipulate in-group and out-group membership when designing our experiment, 
there are three ways in which the self-other distinction might be primed in our studies, and might 
therefore have contributed to egocentric bias. Firstly, in every case, and whether the trial was a 
memory trial, belief trial or a film trial, two ‘others’ were described in the description, usually with 
accompanying proper names (e.g. Sally and Ann, Judy and Judy’s dad). This makes clear that the 
events are happening to ‘named’ others external to the participant’s own direct experience, and hence 
more bias may be produced as a result. Alternatively, others’ beliefs are not our own, but our 
memories are, and this distinction in experiment 1 may itself prime a self-other differentiation. By this 
account, more bias is introduced because the specific instruction that the participant is asked to 
respond to regards another individual (the other) rather than the participant (the self). Thirdly, when 
participants are asked to reason from another’s mental state specifically, the self-other distinction is 
primed more than when they are asked to reason from a non-mental state or a memory. However, 
three arguments militate against the idea of the self-other distinction alone accounting for bias 
concerns the scenarios themselves. Firstly, if the self-other distinction is primed by references to the 
protagonists in the text more generally, then we should not expect any difference in the levels of bias 
between any condition, since the self-other distinction is equivalent in each case. This is contradicted 
by the results of experiment 1, which found more bias on belief trials than memory trials, despite the 
scenarios always referring to two others who experienced the events in question. Secondly, if the self-
                                                           
4 We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this point. 
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other distinction is made most salient when the reference to the protagonist occurs not just in the 
scenario preamble but in the critical question on the final slide, then we should see less bias on those 
occasions where the protagonist was not referred to in the test question itself, namely on the film trials 
in experiment 2. Although these trials mentioned the protagonist in the final slide (e.g. “Then Steve 
comes back, still holding the camera”), they omitted the protagonist from the critical test question 
(e.g. “Where will the camera show…?”). Nevertheless, bias did not differ between belief questions 
which did include the protagonist in the question, and these film trials which did not. Further evidence 
comes from experiment 1, in which the test questions always referred to the protagonist, regardless of 
whether that trial was a memory trial (e.g. ‘Where did she put the red toy dog…?”) or a belief trial 
(e.g. “Where is he going to look for the ice cream?’) (italics added). Despite the presence of the 
protagonist in each case, participants showed more bias on belief trials than memory trials. Since in 
both cases the participant is explicitly instructed to take into account either what the protagonist did, 
or what the protagonist thinks, any remaining difference in bias between memory and belief trials is 
therefore more likely to be attributable to the type of information being reasoned from, rather than the 
individual character per se. Finally, if reasoning from another’s belief is what primes the self-other 
distinction, then we should expect a difference between belief trials and film trials in experiment 2. 
No such difference was evident. It would appear therefore that it is not the self-other distinction but 
rather the type of the information being reasoned from that is most important in generating differences 
in egocentric bias. Crucially for present purposes, it would therefore appear that the primary outcomes 
of the present research, namely that reasoning from representations elicits more bias than reasoning 
from semantic content, and that non-mental representations are capable of inducing bias, and 
evidently as much bias, as mental representations, are not undermined. Nevertheless, the self-other 
distinction remains an interesting avenue of research, and it would be useful to clarify its role (or 
otherwise) in generating egocentric bias via more direct testing. One possibility would be to ask 
participants to indicate where the object was according to their own memory, and contrast this with 
trials in which they were instructed to indicate where the object was in the protagonist’s memory. 
Presumably, any distinction between the degrees of bias on one trial type or the other would therefore 
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be specific to a self-other distinction, and this could then form a baseline for further contrasts of 
interest. 
The current results also go some way towards elucidating the mechanism that may be causing 
adults’ biases when attributing beliefs. There are two accounts that the results of the present study do 
not appear to support. Firstly, within the developmental psychology literature, children’s difficulty 
with the false belief task has sometimes been ascribed to a difficulty in understanding that another 
person may have a different belief to themselves, and sometimes it has been ascribed to a difficulty 
understanding that beliefs, which are intended to be true representations, may sometimes be false (e.g. 
Bloom & German, 2000). Comparing performance when participants reason about beliefs and film 
allows for these theoretical positions to be distinguished because beliefs and films differ in whether or 
not they are intended to be true. Beliefs are true if they accurately represent reality, or false if they do 
not. In contrast, films that do not represent a current reality may be considered outdated, but because 
they are not intended to represent reality they are not false (e.g. a photograph depicting a person on a 
beach is not considered false because that person is now at work, cf. Perner & Leekam, 2008). Our 
results suggest that the bias found in the Sandbox Task is not the result of adults finding it difficult to 
process representations that are intended to be true to reality, such as beliefs. 
Additionally, the results presented here would appear at least on first view not to support the 
‘curse of knowledge’ account (e.g. Birch & Bloom, 2004; 2007), which predicts that our judgments of 
other people’s naive states are contaminated by what we ourselves know. Firstly, in some 
instantiations the account is also associated with bias when reasoning not only about another’s mental 
state but also about one’s own naïve or uninformed past state (e.g. Birch & Bloom, 2004). Given that 
memory trials are linked to an uninformed past state (in the context of present reality), the curse of 
knowledge account could predict bias for those trials. Since we found no evidence of bias on memory 
trials, this account would need to treat these trials as informed (as opposed to uninformed) or non-
naïve past states. This may well be the case, since the memory trials in the present study did not refer 
to information that is later revealed to be untrue, but simply becomes outdated after the item is moved. 
However, if we accept this characterisation of memory trials, it is unclear how the curse of knowledge 
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account could explain the clear evidence of bias on film trials, which clearly shares the property of 
being outdated.  
Instead, our results appear to support the explanation that it is representations per se, mental 
or non-mental, that are difficult to process when they differ from reality. The results of the first false 
photo study by Zaitchik (1990) led her to suggest this as a candidate explanation for children’s 
performance on false belief tasks. Nevertheless, we do not claim that both films and beliefs are 
therefore processed by one and the same mechanism. Behavioural dissociations between false photos 
and false beliefs have been demonstrated in related tasks in both children and adults (Perner et al., 
2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Slaughter, 1998; Zaitchik, 1990), and are further backed up by 
evidence of dissociations in the regions of the brain recruited for each format (see Schurz et al, 2014, 
for a review). Cohen and colleagues (2015) recently suggested that there may indeed be a domain-
specific process for mental representations that, though privileged for this format, can be extended to 
the processing of non-mental representations (the ‘by-product account’; see also Cohen & German, 
2010, and Bowler, Briskman, Gurvidi, & Fornells-Ambrojo, 2005). They posit that such a mechanism 
may be co-opted by non-mental representations such as photographs, but at a cost. In Experiment 2 
we found some —albeit weak — evidence of greater bias on false film than false belief trials which, 
though limited in strength, is consistent in direction with some previous research (e.g. Cohen & 
German, 2010; Cohen et al., 2015; Perner et al., 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Zaitchik, 1990). Our 
evidence would appear at a minimum not to contradict the relative difficulty of non-mental 
representations that the account predicts. Overall, we take the findings of the present study only to 
support the hypothesis that egocentric bias is unlikely to be unique to the processing of mental state 
representations. 
In sum, our results not only corroborate previous findings that adults are egocentrically biased 
when indicating the location of objects on the basis of another’s false belief, but go on to show that 
this egocentric bias occurs even when adults indicate the location of objects on the basis of false non–
mental representations. Consequently, the current experiments provide evidence that adults’ 
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egocentric difficulties when reasoning about others’ false beliefs are not specific to processes 
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Table 1. Order and type of trials. 
 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Direction Distance Location A Location B 
 Trial Belief  Belief-Film Film-Belief  Direction Distance   (% from left)  (% from left) 
1 Memory False Belief False Film right short 50.2 (6) 72.8 
2 Memory False Belief False Film left long 80.2 (7) 34.9 
3 False Belief False Belief5 False Film5 left short 40.1 (1) 17.5 
4 False Belief False Belief False Film right long 30.1 (2) 75.4 
5 True Belief True Belief True Belief right long 33.4 (5) 78.7 
                                                           
5 Removed from analyses owing to wording error (see supplemental material for details). 
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6 False Belief False Film False Belief left long 70.2 (3) 24.9 
7 False Belief False Film False Belief right short 60.1 (4) 82.8 
8 Memory False Film False Belief right long 43.4 (8) 88.8 







Figure 1. Schematic of the two contrasts that are required to support a mental-state specific account of 
egocentric bias. See main text for description. 
 32 
 
Figure 2. Slides from an example memory trial from Experiment 1. See text for details of procedure. 





 Figure 3. Bias as a proportion of the total trough size for Experiment 1. Outliers beyond 1.5 x 
IQ but within 3 x IQ indicated by circles. From a baseline of zero, * = bias significant at p < .05 level; 





Figure 4. Distribution of mean locations as indicated by participants for each trial type in Experiment 











Figure 5. Slides from an example false belief trial from Experiment 2. In the false belief condition, the 
trial would differ only in that the critical question on the final slide (in this example, it read “Where 
will the camera show the spare house key is?”. See text for details of procedure. A full list of the texts 






Figure 6. Bias as a proportion of the total trough size for Experiment 2. Outliers beyond 1.5 x IQ and 
3 x IQ indicated by circles and stars respectively. From a baseline of zero, † = bias marginally 






 Figure 7. Distribution of mean locations as indicated by participants for each trial type in 
Experiment 2. The two reference lines refer to the first (false) location (always at point zero) and 
second (true) location. 
 
